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ABSTRACT 
 
Sensor nodes are tiny, low-power and battery constrained electromechanical devices 
that are usually deployed for sensing some type of data in different types of areas. Because 
of their memory and computational restrictions, public key cryptography (PKC) systems 
are not suited for sensor nodes to provide security. Instead, private key cryptography is 
preferred to be used with sensor networks and there has been considerable work in this 
area, but there still exist problems with private key cryptography because of memory 
restrictions of sensor nodes. Number of keys that can be deployed into a sensor node is 
determined by the available memory of that node which is limited even private key 
cryptographic techniques are applied. So, new key distribution mechanisms are required to 
decrease number of pairwise keys that are deployed into a sensor node. 
 
Random key pre-distribution mechanisms have been proposed to overcome memory 
restrictions of sensor nodes. These mechanisms are widely accepted for sensor network 
security. Simply, these schemes try do decrease the number of keys to be deployed in each 
sensor node in a sensor network and provide reasonable security for the sensor network. 
 
Random key pre-distribution schemes proposed until now have some deficiencies. 
Some of these schemes are too complicated and too difficult to be applied. Schemes that 
seem deployable involve unrealistic assumptions when real world scenarios are considered. 
In this thesis, we propose random key pre-distribution mechanisms that are simple and 
easily deployable. 
 
In this thesis, we first developed a generalized random key pre-distribution scheme. 
Then we proposed three random key pre-distribution mechanisms based on this generalized 
scheme and we provided their simulation results and their comparison to well-known 
random key pre-distribution schemes in the literature. Our generalized scheme allows 
different systems to be derived according to deployment needs. It offers simple, easily 
deployable distribution mechanisms and provides reasonable connectivity and resiliency 
with respect to its simplicity.  
 
v 
ÖZET 
 
Duyarga düğümleri genellikle değişik alanlara belirli bir tipteki veriyi algılamak 
maksadıyla dağıtılan küçük, düşük enerjiyle çalışan ve pil gücü zayıf elektromekanik 
cihazlardır. Hafızaları ve sayısal hesaplama kabiliyetleri kısıtlı olduğundan dolayı açık 
anahtarlı şifreleme sistemleri (PKC) duyarga düğümlerinin güvenliğini sağlamak için 
kullanılmaya uygun değildir. Açık anahtarlı şifreleme sistemlerinin yerine özel(tek) 
anahtarlı şifreleme teknikleri tercih edilmektedir fakat duyarga düğümlerinin hafıza 
kısıtlarından dolayı hala özel anahtarlı şifreleme sistemlerinin kullanımıyla ilgili sorunlar 
mevcuttur. Bir duyarga düğümüne yüklenebilecek anahtar sayısı o düğümün eldeki hafıza 
miktarı tarafından belirlenir ve özel anahtarlı şifreleme yöntemlerinin kullanılmasını da 
sınırlandırır. Böylelikle bir duyarga düğümüne dağıtılan anahtar sayısını azaltabilecek yeni 
anahtar dağıtım mekanizmalarına ihtiyaç ortaya çıkmaktadır. 
 
Duyarga düğümlerinin hafıza sorunlarının üstesinden gelebilmek için rastlantısal ön 
yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım mekanizmaları önerilmiştir. Bu mekanizmalar duyarga ağlarının 
güvenliğinin sağlanmasında genel kabul görmüşlerdir. Basit olarak bu mekanizmalar her 
bir duyarga düğümüne yüklenen anahtar sayısını azaltmaya çalışırken aynı zamanda 
duyarga ağlar için kabul edilebilir seviyede güvenlik sağlamaya çalışmaktadırlar. 
 
Şu ana kadar önerilen rastlantısal ön yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım mekanizmalarının 
bazı eksiklikleri vardır. Bazıları çok karmaşık, bazılarının ise uygulaması çok zordur. 
Önerilen mekanizmaların uygulanabilir olanlarının gerçek dağıtım senaryoları 
düşünüldüğünde gerçek dışı kabullenmeleri mevcuttur. Bu tezde uygulanması ve 
dağıtılması kolay rastantısal ön yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım mekanizmaları önerilmektedir. 
 
Bu tezde öncelikle genel bir ön yüklemeli anahtar dağıtım şeması önerilmiştir. Daha 
sonra bu genel mekanizmanın üzerine bina edilmiş üç rastgele ön yüklemeli anahtar 
dağıtım mekanizması önerilmiş, bunların simülasyon neticeleri sunulmuş ve literatürde iyi 
bilinen şemalarla karşılaştırmaları yapılmıştır. Genel mekanizma dağıtım ihtiyaçlarına göre 
farklı şemaların türetilmesine olanak tanır. Ayrıca basit, kolaylıkla dağıtılabilen, kabul 
edilebilir bağlantı oranı ve dayanıklılık sağlayan mekanizmalar önerir.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Wireless sensor networks have a remarkable attention in a few past years.  A sensor 
network involves deployment of a large number of small nodes. These nodes sense data 
specific to that environment and report them to other nodes over a flexible architecture. 
Sensor networks are best suited to be deployed in hostile environments and over large 
geographical regions. In other words, sensor networks are suited to be deployed over 
unattended areas. 
 
Sensor networks have been useful in various applications such as:  
 
i. Environmental monitoring 
ii. Military monitoring 
iii. Building monitoring 
iv. Healthcare 
 
Sensor networks have broad application areas, and they consist of computationally 
limited, low-memory and battery constrained microelectromechanical devices. The most 
important restriction on sensor networks is battery power. The other important restriction 
on sensor networks is the lack of reasonable amount of memory. 
 
Security that must be provided by sensor network applications is limited because of 
memory and computational restrictions. Public key cryptography (PKC) techniques are not 
suited to sensor networks because key sizes of PKC is too big and computation power 
required is far from an ordinary sensor node can provide. Thus, conventional cryptography 
(private key cryptography) is more likely to be applied to sensor networks. 
 
Distributing one key to each node requires very little memory but compromise of one 
node yields compromise of whole network communication. Deploying each node with keys 
of all other nodes provides very high security but it is not possible for sensor networks with 
larger number of nodes. The innovation in key distribution for sensor networks is proposed 
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in [9]. Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme that is 
applicable to sensor networks. Simply a large key pool is generated and each node is loaded 
with a pre-defined number of keys (key ring) by picking them from the global key pool in 
uniformly random fashion. All nodes are then disseminated on to the deployment area 
uniformly. Each node shares some keys with its neighbors with some probability and a 
securely communicating network can be formed with the key sharing information between 
sensor nodes. This scheme allows a secure network to be formed by using small number of 
keys but treats each node to be located at any position with equal probability which is not 
the case. In [15] Du et al. made use of location knowledge of nodes and a grid-based key 
distribution scheme is generated. In this scheme a batch of nodes are assumed to be 
deployed at center points of each cell of a grid. So nodes in the same batch would be close 
to each other on the deployment area. This simple knowledge enables this scheme to use 
less number of keys as compared to the one in [9] which is also called as the basic scheme. 
 
The aim of the study in this thesis is to develop a grid-based key distribution scheme 
which is easily applicable and secure with respect to its simplicity. The scheme is a 
generalized mechanism that also covers the basic scheme and the scheme proposed in [15]. 
All these schemes are special cases of our generalized scheme. In other words grid-based 
key distribution schemes proposed until know can be expressed by our scheme. 
 
Three derivations of our scheme are generated. The first derivation is called as ABAB 
scheme and makes use of simple location knowledge in order to decrease number of keys 
deployed in each node. In this scheme deployment simplicity is the main objective. The 
other scheme is called as ABCD scheme and it makes use of a bit more deployment 
knowledge as compared to the first scheme and aims further improvement of security. The 
third derivation is ABCD-Cyclic scheme and it is a variant of ABCD scheme that is 
specifically designed for allowing enlargement in both directions. These schemes are 
simulated in order to realize easily applicable and secure key distribution mechanisms.
3 
2 INTRODUCTION TO SENSOR NETWORKS AND SECURITY 
 
 
Recent advances in wireless communications resulted in development of low power, 
tiny, microelectromechanical devices. Sensor devices can be described as one sort of those 
microelectromechanical devices that can be used in the area of environmental, health, 
battlefield etc applications. One of the best surveys about sensor networks can be found in 
[1], [2]. These surveys provide valuable information about sensor nodes, sensor networks, 
and their area of applications, sensor network physical layer aspects, sensor network 
topologies, and sensor network communication protocols. 
 
In particular a sensor node (sensor node, sensor will be used interchangeably from 
this point forward) can be described as a low power, tiny, microelectromechanical, 
computationally restricted device that usually runs on a battery and is capable of sensing 
information for a specific purpose. A sensor network can be described as a network of 
several communicating sensor nodes that is deployed for a specific sensing purpose on any 
area. 
 
Main purpose of a sensor node is sensing, processing and transmission of 
collected/sensed data. The actual phenomenon of sensor nodes are sensing as the name 
implies. Sensor networks are prone to failures and because of that reason they are usually 
densely deployed. Deployment areas of sensor networks can vary from battlefields to state 
buildings. After this brief introduction to sensor networks and their application areas, more 
detailed examination regarding sensor network components, sensor network topologies, and 
usage, deployment areas will be provided. 
 
As a realization of a sensor network application, assume that a greenhouse is being 
inspected for changes of temperature, water pollutants, and fertilized chemicals. In this 
application, sensor nodes sense environmental information, in this case, temperature, water 
pollutants and fertilized chemicals according to a time schedule. After collection of data 
sensor nodes may determine some statistical information (e.g the highest, the lowest and 
the mean temperature information) and send it to a controller node (also known as a sink). 
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The staff responsible for the greenhouse can take necessary actions according to the 
information sent by different sensor nodes in different locations. 
  
Taking into account the greenhouse scenario above, it is obvious that sensor nodes 
require wireless communications and networking capabilities. Ad hoc networking 
techniques may not be well suited to sensor networks because of the differences between ad 
hoc and sensor networks. Mentioning the differences between ad hoc networks and sensor 
networks can be a good lead for a better understanding of sensor networks. Differences 
between these two types of networks can be listed as: 
 
a- Number of nodes in a sensor network may be much more than an ordinary ad hoc 
network.   
 
b- Sensor nodes are prone to failures. 
 
c- Because of a) and b) sensor networks are densely deployed as compared to ad hoc 
networks. 
 
d- Sensor nodes are limited in terms of power, computational capabilities and 
memory. 
 
e- Sensor nodes use broadcast communication mechanism in order to communicate 
with their neighbors and also communication ranges of sensor nodes are shorter than nodes 
in ordinary ad hoc networks. 
 
2.1 Sensor network applications 
 
Nodes that are forming a sensor network may be capable of sensing different sorts of 
data such as temperature, humidity, pressure, movement, soil makeup, etc. Since sensor 
nodes are manufactured with some sensing capabilities sensor networks are used in very 
different applications [1]. Some of them are described below. 
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2.1.1 Military applications 
 
Usage of sensor networks in military applications can be combined as:  Monitoring 
friendly forces, equipment and ammunition, battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance of 
opposing forces and terrain, targeting, battle damage assessment; nuclear, biological and 
chemical attack detection and reconnaissance. 
 
2.1.2 Environmental applications 
 
Environmental applications of sensor networks can be combined as tracking the 
movement of birds, small animals and insects, monitoring environmental conditions that 
affect crops and livestock, irrigations, forest fire detection, flood detection, bio-complexity 
mapping of the environment, and pollution study. 
 
2.1.3 Health applications 
 
Some of the health applications for sensor networks provide interfaces for integrated 
patient monitoring, diagnostics, drug administration in hospitals, tracking and monitoring 
doctors and patients in a hospital. 
 
2.1.4 Home applications 
 
Sensor networks can be effectively used in home automation. Sensor networks are 
well suited to home users in order to manage home devices locally and remotely. 
 
2.1.5 Other commercial applications 
 
Some of commercial applications that sensor networks can be used are: 
Environmental control in office buildings, detecting and monitoring car thefts, managing 
inventory control, and vehicle tracking and detection. 
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2.2 Sensor network issues 
 
Issues on sensor networks can be various, because of their low power, 
communication and computational resources designing a sensor network requires more 
effort that must be put in contrast to other types of networks. Issues regarding sensor 
networks can be listed as [2]: Fault tolerance, scalability, production costs, operating 
environment, sensor network topology, hardware constraints, transmission media, power 
consumption, and security. The main objective of this work is to design a simple and 
applicable random key pre-distribution mechanism so the focus of this section will be 
mainly on sensor network security. 
 
2.2.1 Fault tolerance and security 
 
Sensor nodes may fail due to lack of power and fault of some sensor nodes in a 
sensor network should not preclude the sensor network fulfilling its main duty.  
 
Actually the level of fault tolerance depends on the purpose of the sensor network. 
For instance, considering a battlefield deployment sensor network must be much more 
reliable than any other deployment purpose. This issue can be defined as reliability of fault 
tolerance. In other words, fault tolerance is the ability to sustain sensor network 
functionalities without any interruption due to sensor node failures [3, 4, 5]. 
 
Fault tolerance is also an important factor in security issues of sensor networks. 
Security is a fundamental service in many areas of applications. From the security point of 
view, fault tolerance defines the sustentation of sensor network communication in a secure 
way without interrupting its main functionalities.  
 
When security comes to mind, physical capture of the nodes is one of the main 
problems. Sensor networks must be resilient against the physical capture of the nodes. That 
means, compromise of sensor nodes should not affect the secure communication of sensor 
nodes and sensor network should sustain secret information to some acceptable degree. 
There exist many security related problems regarding sensor networks. The acceptable 
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degree changes accordingly to deployment area, deployment purpose, number of nodes, 
manageability and security desired. In section 1.5, sensor network security issues will be 
examined in detail. 
 
2.2.2 Scalability 
 
The number of nodes deployed in a sensor network may be in the order of thousands 
according to the purpose of deployment. Sensor network schemes must be able to work 
with that amount of nodes. When the number of nodes increase dealing scalability becomes 
a real problem. Scalability is not only the problem of managing with such number of nodes 
but also dealing with extension of the sensor field while providing same level of security 
and manageability.  
 
Scalability cannot be determined in any measurement without considering security 
issues. When security is involved scalability becomes a more complicated issue to handle. 
In this thesis, the proposed scheme aims to improve scalability while keeping security 
concerns in mind. 
 
2.2.3 Production costs 
 
Sensor networks consist of a large number of sensors as compared to traditional 
sensors. So it is very important to determine the cost of a sensor network before 
deployment and if the sensor network is not cost affective, there is no point is deploying a 
sensor network instead of traditional sensors. The cost of a sensor node must be kept low so 
that the realization of sensor networks is feasible [6, 7]. 
 
2.2.4 Hardware constraints 
 
A sensor node is mainly made up of four basic components.  
 
i. a sensing unit for sensing data 
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ii. a processing unit for processing received data 
iii. a transceiver unit for wireless communications 
iv. and a power unit  
 
The most important constraints on sensor networks are battery power, processing 
power and memory size. While security in mind, constraints on processing power and 
memory are the most important determiners of the security schemes that are to be deployed. 
For instance, memory size is very important to determine the key size and number of keys 
to be deployed. Moreover because of processing power constraints, traditional 
cryptography is more suitable to be applied as compared to public key cryptography.  
 
2.2.5 Sensor network topology 
 
There is no predefined network topology for sensor networks. In other words, there is 
no particular infrastructure specially designed for sensor networks. After deployment of 
sensors onto the target area a properly communicating network is formed usually in a hop 
by hop fashion. Each node communicates with the nodes in its neighborhood (one hop 
neighbors) and communication with other sensors is achieved by the help of neighboring 
sensors. Such networks can be called as “infrastructureless”.  
 
2.3 Deployment environment 
 
With respect to the purpose of sensor network applications, their deployment areas 
would change. Except for deployment schemes done by hand, usually deployment areas are 
unattended. As a list of sample deployment areas [1], please see below  
 
 
- The bottom of a sea or an ocean, 
- On the surface of a sea or an ocean,  
- In a building or a warehouse, 
- In a drain or river moving with current, 
- In a biologically or chemically contaminated field, 
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- In a battlefield beyond the enemy lines, 
- Attached to animals, 
- Attached to fast moving vehicles. 
 
Since deployment areas are different, sensor node properties should also be different. 
For instance, a node that is deployed behind an enemy line should be capable of 
communicating even if the communication lines are noisy. In another case, the nodes under 
the water should be resistant to high pressure and water proof. Various kinds of sensor 
nodes can be manufactured to be used in very different applications. The term “sensor 
node” does not refer to a single type of device but it refers to a device that can be 
manufactured for different purposes. The only generalization that can be made about sensor 
nodes is that they are manufactured for sensing data, as the name implies. Any scheme to 
be used with sensor networks such as routing, security, etc. should consider those aspects of 
deployment environments. Assume that deployment takes place on habitat of some insects, 
deployment schemes proposed until now may not be suitable and new schemes may be 
needed. For instance, aerial scattering may not be suitable for deployment and sensors 
should be disseminated from a moving vehicle such as a truck. In this case the density of 
nodes and the path of deployment must be determined by a different scheme. As a result it 
can be said that, since there are different application areas for sensor networks and there are 
very different areas to deploy, it is obvious that there should be different schemes for 
routing, security etc. 
 
There exist different aspects of sensor networks such as transmission media, power 
consumption, communication protocols, protocol layers and data processing. These 
concepts are all in relation to sensor networks but not too much concerned with the idea in 
this thesis. Data processing is an important concept in sensor networks. If a few words 
needed on data processing; energy consumption in data processing is much less than 
consumption in data communication. Any scheme (routing, security, etc) should be able to 
decrease the communication among sensor nodes in an efficient manner such that sensor 
nodes can sustain functioning properly for a longer time. Extensive information is provided 
in [1] and [2].  
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2.4 Security background 
 
In order to explain some concepts about security issues regarding sensor networks a 
simple introduction to security primitives is needed. In this part, a brief explanation of 
some security concepts is provided. 
 
Main security services can be listed as: 
 
- Authentication: Authentication can be simply described as proof of identity. 
Assume that two parties are communicating with each other, if one party can 
assure that the other party is the really the one it claims to be, and then 
authentication is provided. As a realization of the concept, assume that Alice 
wants to open the door of a laboratory that is protected by a fingerprint 
mechanism. If Alice is an authorized one then her fingerprint must have been 
registered and she should be able to open the door with her fingerprint. In 
other word, Alice authenticates herself with her fingerprint. 
 
- Data Confidentially: Data Confidentiality can be described as protection of 
data from unauthorized disclosure. For instance, assume that Alice wants to 
send a message to one of her friends Bob. Alice should make sure that no one 
other than Bob can read her message. So she puts her message in a box and 
locks the box with a key. She gives an identical key to her friend Bob and 
nobody other than Alice and Bob has an identical key. Bob opens the box 
with the key and reads the message. He is sure that nobody other than 
himself can read the message. 
 
- Data Integrity:  Data integrity is the assurance that data is received exactly as 
sent. For instance, assume that Alice sends a message to one of her friends 
Bob and she must make sure that the message she sent was not altered on the 
way to her friend Bob. 
 
Cryptography is the term that refers to “act of secret writing”. Writing in a secret way 
can be achieved by use of a secret key. Secret keys are nothing other than sequence of bits 
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that is known only to authorized parties. Keys are used in different cryptographic 
algorithms such that a plain text is converted in such a form that it cannot be read without 
the reverse operation with the same key applied to the cipher text. Data confidentiality can 
be provided by secret keys as long as the secret key is not known to any unauthorized party 
which explains why this cryptographic technique is defined as “secret”. For instance, 
assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key. Alice sends a message to her friend Bob 
encrypted by a secret key, and no one other than Alice and Bob can open the message and 
cannot read the message, so that confidentiality is provided. In a formal way: 
 
PCD
CPE
D
E
K
K
=
=
)(
)(
Decryption:
Encryption:
TextCipher  :C
TextPlain  :P
Key Private :K
 
 
Public key cryptography is another technique that uses two different but mathematically 
related keys for encryption and decryption. These keys are a public key that is freely 
distributed to everyone and a secret key that is known only to the owner. A plain text that is 
encrypted under the public key can only be decrypted by the corresponding private key, so 
no one other than the owner of the private key can read the message. Data confidentially is 
achieved. If a plaintext is encrypted under the private key than encrypted message can be 
freely disclosed by anyone who owns the public key. This technique proves that the 
message is originated from the owner of the private key since the private key is known only 
that person. Actually this technique is known as “digital signature”; the message is signed 
by the owner of the private key that proves his/her identity, so authentication is provided if 
the message is not a replay.  
 
Key sizes of public key cryptography technique are larger as compared to key sizes in 
secret key cryptography. Also computational overhead of public key cryptography is 
greater than secret key cryptography, and public key cryptography is not suitable for bulk 
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encryption. Secret key cryptography and public key cryptography are not substitutes of 
each other. Public key cryptography is usually utilized in exchanging secret keys, and 
signing messages (digital signatures). Large key sizes and computational overhead of 
public key cryptography makes it inefficient to use with sensor nodes, so conventional key 
cryptography has to be preferred to be used with sensor networks. 
 
Until now, examples to confidentiality and authentication are given. In order to give 
an example to data integrity hash functions should be explained. A hash function is a 
function that converts any length of input to a fixed size unique output. Actually the output 
is a fingerprint of the input. Whenever a message is to be sent to another party, a hash of 
message is calculated, the original message is encrypted under the key. The hash is 
appended to the original message and sent to other party. The receiver decrypts the message 
under the key and calculates the hash of the decrypted message, this hash and the hash 
appended to the message are compared, if they match then the message is not altered in 
some way and integrity is provided. Figure 2.1 depicts the way integrity is provided by 
hash functions. 
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Figure 2.1. Integrity provided by hash functions 
 
Key agreement is another fundamental issue in security. Actually key exchanging 
protocols based on public key cryptography is not suitable for sensor networks, widely 
accepted approach is pre-distributing symmetric keys in sensor nodes before deployment. 
 
Previous work on sensor network applications can be grouped in many different areas 
but, here, focus will be on security issues, routing issues and clustering issues. These topics 
are all the major concerns related to sensor networks as in many other types of networks. 
14 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a random-key deployment scheme so the 
main emphasis will be on security issues regarding sensor networks. This part is intended to 
give a deep understanding of these three concepts in sensor networks. One step forward is 
the description and detailed explanation of the proposed approach by the author. 
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3 PREVIOUS WORK ON SENSOR NETWORK ISSUES 
 
 
In order to explain all the concepts in this thesis a brief explanation of security 
concepts frequently referred and an overview of the previous work should be presented. 
After providing vital security concepts most of this chapter is dedicated to previous work 
on random key pre-distribution schemes and other security mechanisms for wireless sensor 
networks.  
 
3.1 Security issues related to sensor networks 
 
Security is a fundamental service in many applications and sensor network 
applications are not exceptions, so solutions to this fundamental issue will be examined and 
discussed throughout this section. 
 
Resurrecting duckling proposed in [8] refers to ad hoc sensor wireless networks, and 
it is useful to realize the innovations presented in this work because it covers security issues 
regarding devices with short range radio coverage. The main idea is that “a duckling  
emerging from its egg will recognize as its mother the first moving object it sees that makes 
a sound, regardless of what it looks like: this phenomenon is called imprinting“. When this 
reality is applied to a transceiver it becomes: When a transceiver initially boots it will 
belong to the first device it communicates and will stay imprinted to that device until the 
imprinted device tells it to die, also it can accept a key from just the imprinted device until 
the duckling dies (e.g. it is out of service). When the ducking boots again it is ready for 
finding another device to imprint. In this approach, devices contact each other in a close 
distance such that no cryptography occurs during the transfer of the secret.  
 
This idea is an innovation in the area of short range wireless communications because 
it offers a scheme that is easy, applicable and cheap. There still exist problems with this 
scheme such that temper-proofness or temper-evidentness. The idea is based on physical 
contact and a natural fact “imprinting”. Even it seems applicable to sensor networks, 
physical contact of sensor nodes on an unattended area is not possible but on attended and 
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relatively small areas it seems possible and applicable. So, new schemes are needed to 
deploy sensor networks especially on unattended and large areas with large number of 
sensor nodes. 
 
3.1.1 Random key pre-distribution schemes without prior deployment knowledge 
 
The most important innovation in key distribution regarding sensor networks is 
proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [9]. This scheme is called as the basic scheme and it 
was subject to various improvements. From this point forward, this scheme and its 
consequences and affects on key distribution will be examined.  
 
Most of cryptographic techniques cannot be applied to sensor networks because of 
computational capabilities, and memory restrictions of sensor nodes. For instance, public 
key cryptography is not suitable to be applied to sensor nodes. Many sensor node 
applications restrict the cryptography limited to conventional cryptographic (private key 
cryptography) techniques. Because of this reason, key distribution becomes a very hard 
problem to solve. A KDC (Key distribution center) may not solve these problems 
effectively because sensor nodes are usually deployed on unattended areas which makes 
key distribution task of KDCs harder. However KDC and PKC (public key cryptography) 
based solutions are not applicable to sensor networks, pre-deployment of keys to sensor 
nodes seems quite applicable while remembering the idea behind the sensor networks. Pre-
distribution of keys to sensor nodes before deployment still has problems. Distributing a 
global key is not suitable since capture of one node will compromise the whole network. 
Distributing one key for each sensor node is not possible even for other types of networks 
that are well-equipped in terms of memory. So, another key distribution mechanism is 
needed that requires less memory and still secure. Randomization seems to be a way of 
achieving this task.  
 
In basic scheme there exists a large key pool P  which a pre-defined number of keys 
(key ring) k are picked from to be loaded into each sensor node. Remember that P  is 
generated offline. In other words, k  numbers of keys are picked in a uniformly random 
fashion from a large key pool P  and pre-loaded into each sensor node. This is the first step 
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and called key pre-distribution phase. 
 
The second phase is called shared key discovery and takes place just after 
deployment. Each node on the deployment area discovers its neighbors in its wireless 
communication range. An easy way of achieving it is to broadcast key identifiers to all 
neighbors in plain-text. Another mechanism that is secure for broadcasting key identifiers is 
described below:  
Each node broadcasts a list of key identifiers kiE
iK
,...,1),(, =αα , where α  is a 
challenge. The decryption of )(α
iK
E  with the proper key by a recipient would reveal the 
challenge α  and establish a shared key with the broadcasting node. If two neighboring 
nodes share a secret key a link is established between these two nodes. A key that is used to 
secure the communication between any two nodes can also be used to secure the 
communications between other pair of sensor nodes. Compromise of a key requires the 
revocation of this key over the whole network, making the links unusable secured by that 
key. 
 
The third phase is path-key establishment. In this phase each node tries to establish a 
link between its neighbors that are in communication range but does not have at least one 
link. Path-key establishment phase is done via the links of each node, in other words a node 
tries to establish a link with its neighbor by the help of its secure neighbors in two or more 
steps. Its secure neighbors may share a key with that node and send one of its keys over 
those links. Shared-key discovery phase has to be finished in order to begin path-key 
establishment phase. 
 
DSN (Distributed sensor network) connectivity has the major importance in this 
scheme. After deployment all sensor nodes must be able to find a secure neighbor, and all 
these secure neighbors must form a connected graph. In this case, the network is connected 
but, it is not needed to be fully connected (each node can establish links with its all 
neighbors in its communication range after completion of shared key discovery phase, 
without needing the path-key establishment phase) since path key establishment phase is 
mainly aims to generate a fully-connected network.  
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Let p  be the probability that a shared key exists between two sensors, n  be the 
number of network nodes, and )1(* −= npd  be the expected degree of a node (the average 
number of edges connecting that node with its graph neighbors). In order to establish the 
desired connectivity two important measures must be examined carefully. 
 
- expected degree of a node, d , such that a DSN of n  nodes is connected 
- given d  and the neighborhood connectivity constraints imposed by wireless 
communication, values of k , and pool P  must be determined to have a connected network 
of size n . 
 
Random graph theory helps to determine d  stated in the first entry. A random graph 
),( pnG  is a graph of n  nodes such that the probability that a link exists between two nodes 
is p . When p  is zero there is no edge in the graph, whereas when p  is one, the graph is 
fully connected. The value p  must be such that ),( pnG  is connected.  
 
Erdos and Renyi [10] showed that, for monotone properties, there exists a value of p  
such that the property moves from nonexistent to certainly true in a very large random 
graph. The function defining p  is called the threshold function of a property. Given a 
desired probability 
cP  for graph connectivity, the threshold function p  is defined by: 
 
[ ] ce
n
c epnGP
−
==
∞→
connected is ),(Prlim  
 
where  
 
n
c
n
np += )ln(  , c is any real constant. 
 
Therefore, given n , p  and )1(* −= npd  can be found with desired probability cP .  
 
Wireless communication constraints may limit neighborhoods to  nn <<'  where 'n  is 
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number of nodes in a neighborhood. This implies that the probability sharing a key between 
any two nodes in a neighborhood is   p
n
dp >>
−
= )1( '
'
 
 
So the probability that two nodes share at least one key in their key rings of size k  
chosen from a given pool of P  keys to 'p  and then derive P  as a function of k . To derive 
the value of P  , given constraint k  for a 'p  that retains DSN connectivity with an 
expected node degree d  note that [ ]keyany  sharenot  do nodes twoPr1' −=p  and thus  
 
!)!2(
))!((1
2
'
PkP
kPp
−
−
−=  since P  is very large, using Starlings’ approximation  
 
for !n   
 
n
n
enn −
+
≈
2
1
2! pi  to simplify the expression of 'p  and obtain:  
 
)
2
12(
)
2
1(2
'
)21(
)1(
1
+−
+−
−
−
−=
kP
kP
P
k
P
k
p   
 
For examples, the reader may refer to [9].  
 
Various schemes based on the basic scheme have been developed so far. From this 
point forward, some necessary information about those schemes will be provided, the basic 
scheme is inspected in detail because it is the basic of the whole work so far.  
 
There still exists an important problem with the basic scheme. Only large random 
graphs are considered of which nodes are uniformly distributed over a deployment area. 
Such an assumption is not realistic and realization of such distribution can only be possible 
in deployment areas on attended areas, done by humans or robots. In other words, the 
20 
scheme itself is assumed to be too uniform to be realized. 
 
Since the memory resources of sensor nodes are restricted, large key rings are needed 
for networks with large number of sensor nodes which does not seem to be applicable to 
real sensor nodes when their capabilities are considered nowadays.  
 
In [11] there are three schemes proposed based on the basic scheme. The first scheme 
proposed is “q-composite scheme” which imposes q  as a security parameter to the network 
in the following way: Sensor nodes must establish a secure link when they share at least q  
number of keys. If neighboring nodes share less than q  keys than a secure link is not 
established between these sensor nodes. In this scheme the idea is to make the network 
resilient against node capture, but it is obvious that in order to apply q-composite scheme, 
neighboring nodes should share more keys as compared to the basic scheme if the global 
key pool size P  is the same for the both of the schemes. In other words, key ring size k  
must be increased to realize the q-composite scheme, so q-composite scheme is only 
applicable when small number of nodes is assumed to be captured. When large number of 
nodes is captured, this scheme is not applicable since capture of one node reveals more 
keys as compared to the basic scheme as already stated in [11].  The other scheme proposed 
is called as “Multipath Key Reinforcement”. When the basic scheme is considered a key 
that is used to secure the communication between two nodes can also be used to secure 
various communication links through the network which spreads the compromise through 
the network. In order to overcome this situation “Multipath key reinforcement” is proposed 
assuming that enough routing information is available. Assume that a node A  knows all the 
disjoint paths to node B . Specifically, BNNNA i ,,...,,, 21 is path created during the initial 
key setup if and only if each link ),(),,),...(,(),,( 1211 BNNNNNNA iii−  has established a 
link during the initial key setup using the common keys in the nodes’ key rings. Let j  be 
the number of such paths that are disjoint (Do not have any links in common). A  then 
generates j  random values jvv ,...,1 . A  then routes each random value along a different 
path to B . When B has received all j  keys, then a new link key can computed by both A  
and B as: 
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jvvvkk ⊕⊕⊕⊕= ...21
'
 
 
In that way, the link is secured by contribution of j random values. In order to overcome the 
security threats that eavesdropping imposes over the network is lowered by this way. But 
the communication overhead that this scheme imposes is not insignificant, both the network 
topology and the communication overhead are significant drawbacks of this scheme. Even 
as stated in [11] 2-hop multipath key reinforcement may be applicable since discovering 
disjoint paths more than two hops is infeasible and q-composite scheme should not be 
applied at the same time with multipath key reinforcement since compounds both schemes’ 
weaknesses. Small key ring size requirement of q-composite scheme weakens the multipath 
key reinforcement scheme.  
 
 The last scheme proposed in [11] is “Random-pairwise keys scheme” that introduces 
node to node authentication. A key can be used to secure various communication links, so a 
node should be certain of communicating with the right node. In order to achieve 
authentication a node identifier is created for each node and each node identifier is matched 
up with k  other randomly selected distinct node identifiers. Also a pairwise key is 
generated for each pair of nodes and stored in the key rings of both nodes along with the 
identifier of the other node. This idea is to ensure that the other node is a legitimate node 
and also this scheme does not allow reuse of the same key by multiple pairs of sensors.  
 
 Until now, key distribution schemes designed for sensor networks have been 
mentioned. Most of these schemes are based on the idea presented in the basic scheme. 
Keeping the same idea in mind, there are other schemes proposed. Especially the 
mathematical structure of keys is prone to changes. There are schemes that mainly focus on 
the key structure, and try to improve the basic scheme. From this point forward, a brief look 
at these schemes is necessary to give a better understanding of the concept. 
 
In the basic scheme there is no information about the structure of the keys such that a 
key is just a piece of secret information to secure the communication between sensor nodes. 
Mathematical structure of these keys affects the key size, key ring size, global key pool 
size, local connectivity and resiliency against node capture. 
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Liu and Ning [12] proposes a scheme that is a generalization of the basic scheme and 
resilient against node capture. This scheme is called “polynomial pool-based key 
predistribution”. As the name implies, there exists a polynomial pool and there are no keys 
deployed in the sensor nodes, instead polynomial shares of a set of bivariate t  degree 
polynomials are deployed in sensor nodes. Mathematically: 
 
A set F  of randomly generated s  bivariate t -degree polynomials over the finite field qF . 
For each sensor node, the setup server randomly picks a subset of 's  polynomials from F  
and assigns polynomial shares of these 's  polynomials to the sensor node.  
 
Sensor nodes discover whether they own a share of the same polynomial and generate 
the key to be used to secure to communication between them. This scheme is resilient 
against node capture, since in order to compromise the network, t  number of sensor nodes 
must be captured which is not easy to achieve since the polynomial shares are distributed 
randomly. So the network size is limited to 
'
)1(
s
st +
 nodes. Number of nodes in that sensor 
network cannot exceed that number of nodes. This scheme can be scalable since new nodes 
can be added dynamically to the network as long as the limit on the number of nodes is not 
exceeded.  Also another scheme “A Pairwise Key Pre-distribution Scheme for Wireless 
Sensor Networks” [13] is based on Blom’s Key Pre-distribution scheme [14] which 
resembles to the idea presented in [13].  
 
3.1.2 Random key pre-distribution schemes with prior deployment knowledge 
 
 Schemes that briefly examined until now do not assume any deployment knowledge. 
All sensor nodes are assumed to be deployed on a field with no prior deployment 
knowledge. Most of the time this assumption is not the case since even the nodes are 
deployed via aerial scattering, there exist knowledge where a sensor node approximately 
resides which can be utilized to decrease the key ring size of a sensor node carries. The 
most remarkable one is proposed by Du et al in [15]. This scheme assumes a grid 
deployment scheme such that nodes are deployed on a grid and distribution of nodes in 
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each zone is Gaussian.  
 
Nodes are assumed to be deployed in the center of each zone in the form of a batch. 
Those batches of nodes are distributed over each zone normally. Normal distribution is 
assumed to best fit the real world deployment scenarios (e.g. aerial scattering). Keys are 
distributed to each node uniformly by selecting from the key pool of the corresponding 
zone. But the key distribution mechanism is quite complicated and does not scale. Each 
zone shares some percent of keys with its neighbor zones and all that key sharing 
computation is offline. With respect to those complications the scheme provides high 
security and resiliency against node capture. Figure 3.1 depicts the deployment points on a 
5x5 grid.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Deployment points of batches in the scheme by Du et al 
 
Dots in Figure 3.1 are target deployment points of batches and nodes in each batch are 
normally distributed over that zone. 
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Figure 3.2. Key sharing mechanism between zones in the scheme by Du et al 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts key sharing scheme between zones. Zone “E” shares its “a” percent of 
keys with zones B, D, H, F and “b” percent of its keys with zones A, C, G, I. Zones that are 
not neighbors do not share any keys so intuitively the number of links that are secured via 
the same key are decreased. This scheme offers improved resiliency against node capture 
and decreases the key ring size remarkably but it is too complicated in terms of pre-
computation steps. Also the ability of a sensor network to scale heavily depends on the pre-
allocation of keys for zones on the corners and residing on the edges which is not proposed 
in this scheme. A generalized scheme that also covers the capabilities of this scheme will 
be proposed in this thesis.  For a more detailed explanation of key distribution and key pool 
generation please refer to [15]. Another scheme that makes use of deployment knowledge is 
presented in [16] which assumes a uniform distribution of keys and nodes in a zone, and 
pairwise pre-deployed key sharing knowledge. This scheme provides remarkable security 
and resiliency against node capture but distribution of nodes and keys in a zone does not 
seem applicable when real deployment scenarios are considered and also scaling the sensor 
network is not possible. 
 
3.1.3 Other key pre-distribution schemes 
  
Another key pre-distribution scheme is proposed in [39]. This scheme proposes an 
innovative approach for key pre-distribution. In this scheme different keys are logically 
mapped to a two dimensional space and position of each node is output of a probability 
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density function. In other words, each node is assumed to be located at a position from a 
pdf  (probability density function) thus each node’s positions are restricted to a sub-area 
and so that the number of keys that should be deployed in each node is aimed to be 
reduced. In other group based deployment models nodes are distributed according to a pdf 
but there is no key position mapping. The distribution mechanism is executed as follows:  
 
i. Deployment area is divided in to cells and each cell is mapped to a key.  
ii. The expected distribution position P  of a node is computed from the probability 
density function.  
iii. A circle with radius r  is drawn and a node Q  that resides in that circle is picked in 
a random fashion.  
iv. The key that is owned by Q  is assigned to P .  
v. If this key is already contained in P  then go to step ii and continue. 
 
Such an approach gives better results than [15] and ours but there exists other 
problems with this scheme. For instance, if large sensor networks are considered such 
deployments do not seem possible because for each node that probability density function 
must be computed which means each node is assumed to be deployed by hand in order to 
be realize the deployment with the proposed scheme. Schemes that assume deployment of 
nodes in batches do not differentiate the nodes in deployment manner but this scheme 
allows each node to be placed according to the pdf which means that in real deployment 
scenario each node must be treated individually or this approach is not stated clearly by the 
authors of the scheme. Another issue regarding this scheme is that iterating the distribution 
algorithm for each node in order to load all keys into sensor nodes before deployment is not 
an easy task especially when it is compared to batch based distribution schemes. But the 
idea presented in this scheme is an innovation and may be applicable to sub-group of sensor 
nodes in each batch. This way, instead of positioning each node according to a pdf, sub-
group of batches may be deployed by applying the algorithm presented in this scheme. 
 
Another deployment scheme is proposed by Mao and Wu [40]. In this scheme square 
and hexagon lattice deployment models are proposed for deployment of nodes on to a 
target area. The contribution of this study is that it proposes a sensor location update 
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mechanisms to optimize sensing coverage and secure connectivity. Square and hexagon 
lattice deployment models aim improving the sensor coverage but in reality these 
deployment models does not seem to be applicable even with few number of nodes. The 
contribution of this work is the proposal of a location update scheme in order to both 
improve the node coverage and secure connectivity under the assumption that sensor nodes 
are mobile in some manner. For further details please refer to [40].  
  
Key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks can be divided into many 
categories. But current approaches mainly focus on group based deployments as in our 
case. Group deployment models enable schemes to have more chance of increasing local 
connectivity with deploying less number of keys since grouped keys are more likely to be 
neighbors on the deployment area. Schemes presented in [15], [16] are both group based 
deployment models and offer considerable security with less number of keys used in each 
node. Zhou et al. proposed another key establishment mechanism for group based 
deployments in [46]. This scheme proposed an approach such that each node in a group of 
nodes shares one key with every other node in the same group. Also inter group key 
establishment is achieved via some agents. There exists pair of agents in two neighboring 
groups such that neighboring sensors from these two groups can establish pairwise keys 
using these pair of agents as intermediaries. This scheme offers high resiliency because it is 
a scheme mainly based on pairwise rather than random key pre-distribution. Actually, 
pairwise key distribution has a drawback. In this type of deployment each node has to carry 
the keys of other nodes in the same group. Number of nodes contained in a group is a major 
determiner of the applicability of these schemes. Groups with large number of nodes are 
not suitable to be deployed in this manner because of the memory constraints of sensor 
nodes.  
 
3.1.4 Other security schemes 
 
Distributing keys to sensor nodes in a sensor network is not the only problem to be 
solved from the security point of view. Authentication, data confidentiality and integrity are 
other security issues to be solved. There exist two schemes that are novel in sensor network 
security area. SNEP (Secure Network Encryption Protocol) and µTESLA (the micro 
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version of Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication) are proposed in [17]. 
SNEP is a protocol that provides data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, 
integrity and freshness. µTESLA is a protocol that is based on delayed key disclosure and 
provides broadcast authentication based on TESLA [19]. TESLA is not originally designed 
for sensor networks µTESLA is a modified version of TESLA that is applicable for sensor 
networks. Actually key distribution is the first building block of the security service that 
should be provided by the security architectures proposed for sensor networks. 
Authentication, data confidentiality, integrity are the other building blocks that should be 
based on key distribution. After key distribution, appropriate authentication and data 
confidentially mechanism can be applied. This idea is best represented in [20] and a 
depiction of the hierarchy is available in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Security integrated with sensor networks 
 
After key distribution, keys are pre-loaded into sensor nodes in this case, a topology 
forming algorithm is executed and in the formed topology a re-keying algorithm can be run. 
As the last step µTESLA can be used to provide hierarchical authentication service. 
 
There exist other protocols to manage keys that are based on super nodes as in [18]. There 
are only two keys to be deployed in each sensor node and assumption is the existence of 
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super nodes a main controller located on an attended and secure area. Such protocols can be 
applied for relatively small sized networks but is not applicable for large networks (e.g. 
sensor networks with thousands of nodes). Another mechanism proposed is LEAP 
(Efficient Security Mechanisms for Large-Scale Distributed Sensor Networks) [21]. This 
scheme explains passive participation and introduces four types of keys. The motivation is 
that, there are different types of messages available so there should be different type of keys 
to be used. Types of keys used are: 
 
- Individual key: Each node has a key that is only shared with the base station to 
communicate in a secure way. 
 
- Pairwise Key: Each node has a pairwise key shared with its each neighbor in 
order to communicate securely. 
 
- Cluster Key: Cluster key is shared with a group of neighboring nodes in order to 
make passive participation available such that a node overhearing the message 
of one of its neighbors can use it without receiving the same information in 
another secure message. 
 
- Group Key: A key shared by all nodes in the network and used for network-wide 
messages. 
 
The idea is novel, but LEAP suffers from an expensive bootstrapping phase. In LEAP 
starting from a master key every node creates a cluster key that distributes to its immediate 
neighbors using pairwise keys that shares with each one of them. This scheme offers 
deterministic security and broadcast of encrypted messages. In [47], a new key 
management scheme is proposed in order to provide deterministic security for wireless 
sensor networks. This scheme assumes three types of keys Node Key, Cluster Key and 
Master Key. Each node shares a node key with the base station; a cluster key is shared with 
each cluster head and with the base station. Master key is a key that is shared among all 
nodes throughout the whole network. A simple clustering algorithm is also proposed in this 
study. Both schemes try to come up with a deterministic key management scheme such that 
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no random key pre-distribution is necessary. Such schemes mainly base their assumptions 
on base stations and clusters. Clustering yields good results in key management since key 
management task is handled as sub tasks, association of keys with base stations in strict 
manner may not be so correct though. Pairwise keys are important to communications 
between sensor nodes which is not taken into consideration in [47]. Pairwise key 
management is taken into consideration in LEAP but, as it is mentioned in this section, it 
suffers from an expensive bootstrapping phase which is not the case in random key pre-
distribution schemes. Key management mechanism that is to be used heavily depends on 
the aim of the deployment. 
 
3.2 Clustering in sensor networks   
  
Clustering in sensor networks is an important issue to be resolved. Clustering is a 
well-known problem that is studied in the area of distributed computing in order to solve 
different problems. Especially clustering is an important area of study in sensor networks 
that is to solve communication overhead problems. Optimization of communication 
bandwidth is an important issue since sensor network communication bandwidths are 
limited and also battery constraints of sensor nodes make clustering an area such that 
considerable effort must be put in. These two constraints, battery power and 
communication bandwidth, lead to development of clustering schemes that try to prolong 
the network life time. 
 
Proposed schemes in this thesis employ group based distribution of sensor nodes over 
a target deployment area. All these groups actually form clusters over the deployment area. 
In other words, even a specific clustering algorithm is not run after deployment because of 
the deployment scheme itself there exist clusters in the whole network. Before deployment, 
a piece of location knowledge is bound to sensor nodes and on the deployment area a 
cluster formation can be assumed because of the nature of group based deployment. In this 
thesis there is no specific clustering algorithm employed but since clustering plays an 
important role in sensor network applications, an examination of clustering algorithms are 
provided. 
 
Since sensor nodes are deployed on to unattended areas and because of the distributed 
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nature of the sensor networks, clustering schemes should work in a distributed manner. 
Cluster head selection and further management of clusters should be achieved without 
intervention of a third party computationally powerful device which means a cluster head is 
an ordinary sensor node. Cluster heads should not be assumed as nodes that have extensive 
computation and battery power. 
 
In [41], LEACH (Low energy adaptive clustering hierarchy), an application-specific 
protocol architecture is proposed. The aim of this protocol is to prolong the network life 
time and evenly distribute the energy load to each sensor. LEACH is a distributed 
clustering algorithm that uses a probabilistic model to select a cluster head. LEACH also 
makes use of a slotted algorithm to reduce the energy consumption of sensor nodes and the 
algorithm operates in rounds. Basically the protocol works as follows: 
 
- Each node probabilistically determines whether it will be a cluster head or not. 
- Nodes that elect themselves as cluster heads announce that they are cluster 
heads. 
- Each node-cluster head node waits for the cluster head announcements and send 
join request to the cluster head that requires the lowest-communication energy. 
- Cluster heads create TDMA schedule and send to cluster members. 
 
The above algorithm iterates in rounds so that cluster heads are chosen with high energy 
and energy load of sensor nodes are evenly distributed throughout the sensor network. Each 
cluster head is elected according to its remaining battery power formally according the 
formula below:  
}1,)(
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Probability that  node i  elects itself as a cluster head in a round, at time t  is computed as 
above where k  is the number of clusters in the sensor network and  )(tEi  stands for the 
energy of node i  and )(tEtotal  stands for the total energy of the network. TDMA schedule 
gives each node a slot to transmit its data to its cluster head and then the node goes to sleep 
to reduce the energy consumption. Cluster heads send their processed data to BS (Base 
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Station). The most important contribution of this algorithm is to distribute energy 
dissipation evenly throughout the whole network thus it increases the system life time. The 
proposed scheme does not include a mechanism to choose the percentage of cluster heads 
for a network. Another issue with this scheme is when to invoke re-election of cluster 
heads. No explanation is given about this issue. Also BS in the scheme can be considered 
as an aggregation point, and cluster heads that are away from BS will dissipate more energy 
than the cluster heads that are closer to BS, so life time of cluster heads that are away from 
BS will be shorter. An approach to solve this problem may be to use a higher level of 
cluster hierarchy as in [36] other than involving only one cluster head. 
 
Another probabilistic distributed clustering scheme is proposed by Younis and Fahmy 
[38]. This scheme is a hybrid algorithm that periodically selects cluster heads according to 
a hybrid of their residual energy and a secondary parameter, such as node proximity to its 
neighbors or node degree. The algorithm is as follows: 
 
- Each node determines whether it will be a cluster head probabilistically. 
- Each cluster head candidate announces itself as a candidate or a final cluster 
head according to the probability in the first round. 
- An ordinary node that receives cluster head announcements determines its 
candidate cluster head according to the power needed to communicate with the 
candidate cluster head. If power levels are the same for each candidate then the 
candidate cluster head with the lowest node degree is chosen as the candidate. If 
a final cluster head message is received then the node ordinary node joins that 
cluster. 
- Candidate cluster heads doubles their cluster head election probability ands goes 
to the first step. 
After execution of above steps if a node is left uncovered then it announces itself as 
a final cluster head. 
 
Probability of becoming a cluster head is determined as: 
maxE
ECCH residualprobprob ×=  
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probC  stands for the initial percentage of  cluster heads among all nodes. probC  is only used 
to limit the initial cluster head announcements where 
residualE  is the estimated current 
residual energy in the node, and maxE is a reference maximum energy (corresponding to a 
fully charged battery) 
 
An energy efficient hierarchical clustering algorithm for wireless sensor networks is 
proposed by Bandyopadhyay and Coyle [36]. The proposed algorithm is not much different 
from the previously proposed clustering algorithms in terms of probabilistic election of 
cluster heads and decrease in the energy used. In this algorithm there are two types of 
cluster heads, volunteer cluster heads and forced cluster heads. Each sensor in the network 
becomes a cluster head with probability p and advertises itself as a cluster head to the 
sensor nodes in its wireless communication range. These nodes are volunteer cluster heads. 
Each advertisement is forwarded to sensors that are k  hops away. No advertisement is 
forwarded more than k  hops. Any node that receives the forwarded cluster head 
advertisement that is not a cluster head joins the cluster of the closest cluster head. A node 
that does not receive a cluster head advertisement becomes a forced cluster head. The 
algorithm proposed in this paper such simple. An important part of this algorithm is to 
determine the parameters p  and k . For further details of determining those parameters 
with different number of sensor network please see [36]. The second part of this algorithm 
proposes a hierarchy of clusters. There exist level 1, level 2, level h clusters. Each node 
senses data and sends collected data to level – 1 cluster heads and level – 1 cluster head 
processes and forwards data collected from level – 1 cluster heads to level– 2 cluster heads. 
The algorithm continues in that way. Election of higher level cluster heads is not much 
different from election of level – 1 cluster heads. Each level – 1 cluster head elects itself as 
a level – 2 cluster head with certain probability 2p  and advertises itself. Any level – 1 
cluster head that receives the cluster head advertisements joins the closest level – 2 cluster 
head. For the formation of level – n cluster heads different probabilities are determined. 
This algorithm focuses on formation of clusters based on minimization of the energy used 
to communicate information from all nodes to the processing center, it does not propose a 
mechanism for dynamic change of cluster heads instead the algorithm is run periodically to 
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give a change every node to be a cluster head. Hence load balancing between sensor nodes 
is tried to be achieved. Energy savings increase while the level of clusters increases. This 
algorithm is one of the earliest algorithms and proposes a novel approach to energy based 
distributed clustering. 
 
Basagni proposed a distributed clustering algorithm for ad hoc networks in [37]. The 
proposed algorithm (DCA) is well suited for quasi-static ad hoc networks. Since in many 
sources sensor networks are defined as static, DCA is suitable for sensor networks also. 
DCA is a weight based algorithm that elects cluster heads according to a weight parameter. 
Even there is no information provided on determination of weights of nodes, this algorithm 
can be considered as a generalized approach in clustering of quasi-static networks. The 
algorithm is simple. The node with the greatest weight sends a cluster head message to its 
neighbors stating that it is a cluster head. A node that receives cluster head messages joins 
the cluster with the greatest weight. If some cluster heads have the same weight then a node 
decides to join the cluster of which cluster head with the lowest id (Each node is assumed 
to be deployed with a unique id). If a node has not received a cluster head message than it 
announces itself as a cluster head. Lowest node id is used to break ties. 
 
3.3 Localization in sensor networks 
 
Localization in ad hoc networks is an important area of study. Especially localization 
mechanisms that can be applicable to quasi-static ad hoc networks are generally applicable 
to sensor networks. Localization techniques may lead reduction in power consumption in 
multi-hop wireless networks and also it is obvious that localization is an important issue for 
routing in wireless sensor networks. 
 
In this thesis, prior location knowledge is used to decrease key ring size of each 
sensor node. Nodes are deployed in groups and location knowledge is already bound to 
each sensor node. Localization mechanisms try to determine position of each sensor 
network as accurate as possible. Our proposed schemes do not make use of exact positions 
of each sensor node but makes use of being a member of a specific group. In other words, 
each sensor node carries the location knowledge it needs to establish key sharing 
information. Since localization mechanisms play an important role in sensor networks and 
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there exists considerable attention in this area an examination of localization schemes is 
presented. 
 
Well-known localization techniques may not be suitable for sensor networks. For 
instance GPS [45] is a publicly available service but because of resource constraints of 
sensor networks it does not seem to be applicable to sensor networks also the location 
determined by GPS may deviate 10-20 meters which can be larger than the deployment 
points of two sensor nodes. GPS-less approaches for localization are needed and there have 
been such algorithms proposed. GPS-less localization techniques are mainly based on 
locally available information to determine relative positions of nodes in the network. Ad 
hoc positioning system (APS) is proposed in [42]. APS resembles to GPS in the way that it 
works. It does not work with satellites but landmarks.  In APS landmarks are connected in 
hop by hop fashion which is different from GPS. A node that have acquired distances to at 
least 3 landmarks can estimate its position in the plane. One hop neighbors of landmarks 
can estimate the distance by direct signal strength measurement. Using some propagation 
method 2 hop neighbors can estimate the distance to the landmark. The propagation 
techniques that could be used: 
 
- “DV-Hop” propagation method 
- “DV-distance” propagation method 
- “Euclidean” propagation method 
 
DV-Hop propagation method estimates the distances according to the hop count. Each 
landmark computes a correction (proximate 1-hop distance) and each node computes its 
distances to the other landmarks by multiplying the correction by the hop count to that 
landmark. All those values are plug into the triangulation procedure in [43]. This is the 
simplest propagation method. The second propagation method is DV-distance. In this 
model distance between neighboring nodes is measured using radio signal strength and 
propagated in meters rather than in hops. DV-distance method is sensitive to measurement 
errors. The last method is Euclidean propagation method. In this method true Euclidean 
distance to the landmark is propagated. In order to compute the Euclidean distance a node 
needs at least two neighbors. Euclidean method is the one that is closest to GPS. 
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GPS-less low-cost outdoor localization for very small devices [44] is another 
approach proposed for localization in sensor networks. This scheme assumes an idealized 
radio model and proposes a simple connectivity based localization method. A fixed number 
of nodes in the network with overlapping regions of coverage serve as reference points and 
transmit periodic beacon signals. All those reference points form a regular mesh structure. 
Nodes use a simple connectivity metric to infer proximity to a given subset of these 
reference points and then localize themselves to the centroid of the selected reference 
points. 
 
Another algorithm proposed for localization in sensor networks is GPS-free 
positioning in mobile ad hoc networks [44]. This scheme tries to come up with a network 
coordinate system for ad hoc networks, since sensor networks are usually assumed as static 
it is applicable to sensor networks also. Distances between nodes are assumed to be 
measured with any method such as time arrival. Each node locates itself as the center of its 
local coordinate system and by triangulisation the angles between the nodes are computed. 
It is obvious that a node needs at least two other 1-hop neighbors for triangulisation. This 
algorithm is executed at each node and after this step all the local coordinate systems of 
each node is rotated and mirrored according to one of the local coordinate system of one 
node. The algorithm proposes an approach for generating a network wide coordinate 
system without help of GPS. 
  
 Localization schemes that do not use GPS use different types of methods to 
determine positions of nodes in the network. For instance APS use landmarks that resemble 
to satellites in GPS. It is not wrong to mention that APS is an adaptation of GPS to ad hoc 
networks. Another approach is to generate a coordinate system with the help of at least two 
other sensor nodes and triangulisation. All those techniques require beaconing and also 
localization techniques make use of some distance measurement methods such as time of 
arrival method or signal strength method. Distance measurement on different areas may 
lead to different problems. For instance, obstacles in outdoor implementations of sensor 
networks may lead to wrong distance measurements. Also the shape of the area is another 
determiner of the health of those measurements. A localization system that is designed 
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should consider this realization issues and of course the application of those localization 
system should tolerate such sort of errors. 
 
3.4 Routing in sensor networks 
 
Routing in sensor networks is another issue to be resolved. There have been various 
schemes designed for routing in sensor networks, but none of them is designed taking 
security issues into consideration. Directed diffusion proposed in [31] is a data centric 
routing algorithm for collecting data from a sensor network. Base stations in the network 
propagate interest for named data. Nodes able to satisfy the interest disseminate 
information along the reverse path of interest propagation. Directed diffusion is a simple 
routing algorithm designed for collecting named data out of the whole sensor network. 
GEAR (Geographical and energy aware routing) [32] and GPSR (Greedy perimeter 
stateless routing for wireless sensor networks) [33] are examples to geographic routing 
protocols designed for sensor networks. GEAR uses energy aware neighbor selection to 
route a packet towards the target region. GPSR resembles GEAR but they are different in 
choosing a path to forward a packet. GPSR chooses the next hop according to its distance 
to the destination. The closest path to the destination is chosen to forward a packet. Such 
routing algorithm results in uneven distribution of energy between sensor nodes. GEAR 
tries to solve this problem by weighting the hopes according to remaining energy and 
distance to the destination. This way energy is more evenly distributed among the nodes in 
the sensor network. Rumor routing proposed in [35] offers an energy efficient alternative 
when high cost of flooding cannot be justified. Rumor routing works with events and 
agents. When a source observes an event it sends an agent on random walk through the 
network. Agents simply carry information about events and at each node it visits, it informs 
the node with the information. All agents have a TTL (time to live) field, list of events and 
list of visited nodes in order not visit the whole network in a cycle. When a base station 
wants to gather information it sends an agent in the same way to collect information 
previously disseminated by the previous agents. 
 
In [22] different types of attacks to routing algorithms are inspected and important 
design considerations are proposed regarding most well-known routing protocols [31], [32], 
[33], [34], [35]. Various algorithms that are based on public key cryptography are proposed 
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to secure ad hoc networks. Algorithms that are proposed for ad hoc networks [23], [24], 
[25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30] are not suitable for sensor networks, so schemes for 
securing sensor networks should be based on private key cryptography. In this thesis there 
is no routing protocol proposed but for whom they work on secure routing in sensor 
networks should be aware of that previous work. 
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4 PROPOSED RANDOM KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop random key pre-distribution schemes that are 
easily deployable, scalable and resilient against node capture attacks. There exists a 
generalized scheme that can be considered as a basis for all zone based distribution 
schemes. There are three schemes proposed that are derivations of the generalized scheme. 
These schemes are analyzed in detail according to scalability, connectivity and resiliency 
they provide. 
 
4.1 Design considerations of the proposed schemes 
  
 Many key distribution schemes for other types of networks are not suitable for sensor 
networks. The innovation regarding key distribution for sensor networks begins with the 
basic scheme [9]. The basic scheme led to many other schemes to be developed based on its 
idea. Background information on the basic scheme is given in Chapter 2. The basic scheme 
itself assumes the uniform distribution of nodes on the deployment which is unrealistic 
when the real world deployment techniques are taken into account. In other words, the 
basic scheme does not seem to be applicable for real world scenarios. When nodes are 
deployed as stated in the basic scheme the appearance of the sensor nodes on the 
deployment area is like in Figure 4.1. This deployment sample is extracted from a simple 
simulation of the basic scheme over a 100 × 100  deployment area. Since the basic scheme 
assumes a uniform distribution of nodes onto the deployment region the appearance of the 
distribution is like the distribution depicted as in Figure 4.1. 
 
39 
 
Figure 4.1. Two hundred nodes distributed uniformly random onto a 100x100 deployment 
area 
 
If the real world deployment techniques are applied such appearance of a sensor network is 
not possible. So first of all, the technique of the node distribution must be picked carefully 
that would fit the real world techniques. One of the most applicable node deployment 
techniques is dropping a batch of nodes onto the deployment area from a moving vehicle, 
for instance from an airplane. In such a case, nodes are expected to concentrate on the 
deployment center and from that deployment center nodes can be assumed to be spreading 
out. The distribution that fits this real world scenario is Gaussian distribution. On the same 
area, when nodes are distributed normally the final appearance of the sensor network is 
expected to be like in the Figure 4.2. As it can be easily seen from Figure 4.2, Gaussian 
distribution is a better way of representing distribution of sensor nodes.  
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Figure 4.2. Two hundred nodes distributed normally on to a 100x100 deployment area 
 
 While designing the key distribution schemes instead of distributing all the nodes on 
the same area, the deployment area is assumed to be a grid and each deployment takes 
place in each zone of this grid as if distributing all the nodes on to the same area. This type 
of grid distribution allows the usage of location knowledge for the keys and disallows 
distributing some keys that will not be used in some zone. So, keys and zones stick together 
in order to decrease the number of keys deployed in each node. 
 
4.2 A generalized random key pre-distribution scheme 
 
Many schemes proposed until now assume zone based distribution, but a framework 
that includes and enhances all those schemes is not present. A generalized scheme that will 
cover the schemes proposed now in terms of key distribution should be proposed. A general 
zone based key distribution mechanism is provided in this thesis in order to propose a 
generalized key distribution mechanism that is scalable and secure. The idea can be 
reflected as in the Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Generalized scheme 
 
In this generalized scheme each zone shares some percent of keys with each of its 
neighbors. For further deployments even there is no neighbor zones to some zone keys are 
reserved thus further deployments without any security compromise can be achieved. 
 
Each zone shares b  or c  percent of keys with its neighbors and no zones that are not 
neighbors share no keys. Different implementations can be provided according to the 
distribution and security issues. This scheme can be treated as a framework for zone based 
key distribution mechanisms. Such distribution mechanism can also be used as it is, even it 
seems complicated. The motivation is to base key distribution schemes on a scalable 
framework. 
 
Since each zone consists of different key pools even though there still exists a global 
key pool, sub key pools for each zone should be stored for the sake of distribution 
simplicity. Also, in order to extend the network some key pools are to be stored. With the 
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following approach all of the keys can be distributed and the whole network can be 
deployed. Following approach is not the only way, but during the implementation of this 
scheme this technique is applied for the sake of simplicity. 
 
Whole deployment area is divided into a nm ×  grid and each zone ji,  is assigned a key 
pool jiG ,  such that jiG , , mi ,...,1=  and nj ,...,1=  consists of sub key pools 
SWGSEGNWGNEG jijijiji .,.,.,. ,,,, , NE  stands for northeast, NW stands for northwest, SE  
stands for southeast and SW  for southwest. In the same way, SGNGWGEG jijijiji .,.,.,. ,,,,  
are the other key pools and there exist the central key pool MG ji ., , M stands for the central 
key pool. For a depiction please see Figure 4.4.  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Sub key pools in a zone 
 
For all groups jiG ,  mi ,...,1=  and nj ,...,1= ,  
 
1) If 01 =−j  then select Sb  keys from the global key pool, assign them 
to NG ji ., and remove those keys from the global key pool else SGNG jiji .. 1,, −= . 
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2) If 01 =−i  then select Sb  keys from the global key pool, assign them to 
WG ji ., and remove those keys from the global key pool else EGWG jiji .. ,1, −= . 
 
3) If mi ≤+1  and 11 ≥−j  then SWGNEG jiji .. 1,1, −+=  else select Sc  keys from the 
global key pool, assign them to NEG ji .,  and remove those keys from the global key pool. 
 
4) If 11 ≥−i  and 11 ≥−j  then SEGNWG jiji .. 1,1, −−=  else select Sc  keys from the 
global key pool, assign them to NWG ji .,  and remove those keys from the global key pool. 
 
5) Select Sx  keys from the global key pool where ax =  for MG ji ., , bx =  for 
EG ji .,  and SG ji ., , cx =  for SWG ji ., and SEG ji ., . 
 
4.3 The first Scheme ABAB 
 
In this scheme, there exist two key pools A  and B . These two key pools share a 
common key pool of s . m  (key ring size) keys are picked in a uniformly random fashion 
from the key pool A  or B  according to the target deployment zone. After that, nodes 
collected as batches and deployed on to the center of each target zone. The motivation 
behind this is to design a simple key distribution scheme that is suitable for most of the 
sensor node deployment purposes. Actually the idea is to make use of that simple location 
knowledge while keeping the distribution as simple as possible. The ABAB scheme is 
depicted for a 22 ×  zone in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Alternating key pool selection of ABAB scheme 
 
This scheme is a derivation of the generalized scheme. In this scheme, the percentage 
c  in the generalized scheme is set to zero. So, there is no key sharing information between 
key pools that are diagonal neighbors. Only key pools that are horizontal and vertical 
neighbors share keys. The percentage b is set to 
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d
 where d  represents the desired key 
sharing percentage between zones. In the generalized scheme, in steps 1, 2 and in step 5 for 
the sub key pools S  and E , keys that are selected to be shared are not removed from the 
key pool and in each of these steps keys that are selected previously are selected again. 
Keys for the central key pool are selected according to the simple algorithm below.  
 
If ji + mod 02 =  then select the keys from key pool A  else select those keys from 
key pool B . 
 
Zone based distribution puts location knowledge and key sharing information 
together in order to decrease m . Regardless of the application, grid structure can be 
considered as a basis for many types of applications and key distribution is an example to 
this technique. Figure 4.6 depicts a larger application of this approach. Even in the basic 
scheme, distributing large number of sensor nodes is not an easy task. For instance, 
distributing 10000 nodes onto a region should be divided into subtasks which make our 
ABAB scheme applicable. Scattering process should be done part by part. So with a simple 
extension to scattering process our scheme becomes applicable and since it makes use of 
location knowledge, it is obvious that it will decrease the number of keys that a sensor node 
should have. This scheme can be implemented in a few steps as below. 
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Step1: Generate key pool A. 
Step2: Pick s  keys from key pool A. 
Step3: Generate key pool W  consisting of sAw −=  keys. 
Step 4: Merge key pools W and s such that B is formed. 
Step 5: For each zone uniformly select m  keys from key pool A  or key pool B  
accordingly and deploy into the nodes. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. ABAB scheme 
 
This scheme can enlarge as new nodes are added to the network in both directions. 
Adding nodes preloaded with keys from the pools A  and B . This scheme gives place to 
simplicity and easiness of deployment. As the place for simplicity and easiness of 
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deployment are decreased security provided is increased. Even with this basic scheme a 
network that is scalable in advance can be deployed. For a depiction of extension to ABAB 
scheme please see Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Extending ABAB scheme 
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4.4 The second scheme ABCD 
 
ABAB scheme is easily applicable in sensor networks but it has a resiliency problem 
since same keys are used in different zones several times. Capture of a node causes 
compromise of keys that are used in other zones. In order to solve this problem, another 
scheme named ABCD scheme is proposed. 
 
Decreasing the number of keys in each zone thus increasing the local connectivity is a 
way of increasing the security. While implementing such a solution distribution of keys 
must be as simple as possible in order to keep the scheme applicable. For such a scenario, a 
new scheme called ABCD scheme, is proposed as shown in Figure 4.8. In ABCD scheme 
two different key pools are generated for each line of deployment. These two key pools 
share some number of keys with its neighbors both vertically and horizontally. For 
instance, assume that key pools A  and B  are generated for the first line of deployment. 
Pool A  and B  share some number of keys. Key pools C  and D  that are generated for the 
second line of deployment share the same number of keys but key pool C  shares the same 
amount of keys with key pool A  and key pool D  shares the same amount of keys with key 
pool B . After generation of all key pools are deployed in alternating manner as depicted in 
Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8.  ABCD scheme 
 
ABCD scheme is also a derivation of the generalized scheme and can be expressed in 
terms of it. Key sharing percentage c  is set to zero which implies that diagonally 
neighboring key pools share no keys. In the generalized scheme, in steps 1, 2 and in step 5 
for sub key pools E  and S  , keys that are selected to be shared between key pools are not 
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removed from the global key pool and for each line of key pool generation, in other words 
for each i  they are stored and used again. For each line of key pool generation, key pools 
are assigned to each zone in the same alternating manner as in ABAB scheme. 
 
The new scheme conveys the idea of the first scheme but it aims to come up with a 
more scalable and resilient scheme making a concession of simplicity. Even, ABCD 
scheme seems more complicated actually it is much simpler than previously designed 
schemes. Even with little previous deployment knowledge and assumption ABCD scheme 
provides considerable connectivity and resiliency comparable to previously designed 
schemes. During all those discussions, the affect of simple deployment knowledge on the 
distribution schemes is inspected. 
 
There is a tradeoff in this scheme. The tradeoff here is deployment simplicity versus 
local connectivity and resiliency. Increasing the key pool size for a zone makes the 
deployment simple but there exists a simple problem that is the security. The simple 
scheme that assumes the simplest deployment knowledge, actually no prior deployment 
knowledge, is the basic scheme. Since the basic scheme assumes no prior knowledge of 
deployment, a large key pool must have to be used and the key ring size of each node must 
be deployed with more number of keys in order to keep the network connected. For 33 % 
connectivity with a global key pool ( S ) of 100000 keys each node should be deployed with 
200 keys that causes the compromise of 200 keys as a result of capturing one sensor node. 
So the main idea should be to decrease the number of keys that should be deployed in each 
node. Prior deployment knowledge of sensor nodes allows the designer of the scheme to 
decrease the number keys to be deployed in each sensor node. Since the number of keys 
that can be deployable into a sensor node in real world applications is limited and also 
resiliency is increased in that way, decreasing the key ring size of sensor nodes should be 
the main target of key distribution techniques. In this scheme alternating distribution of 
keys for each zone on the horizontal line is a simple task; also arrangement of key pools 
vertically is a simple task. Key distribution process can be described as follows. 
 
Key pools that are to be deployed for each zone are described as jiG ,  where ji, are 
the coordinates of each zone. v  is the number of keys that is to be deployed in each zone 
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and w  is the number of keys that are shared between key pools both vertically and 
horizontally.  
 
1) For group 1,iG  select wv 2−  keys from the global key pool S  then remove those 
keys from the global key pool and assign those keys to 1,iG . Also for group 2,iG  select 
wv 2−  keys from the global key pool S  then remove those keys from S  and assign those 
keys to 2,iG . For group 1,iG  and 2,iG  select w  keys from S  then remove those keys from S  
and assign them to both 1,iG  and 2,iG . 
 
2) For groups jiG ,  where 2,1=i  and nj ,...,2=  select wv 2−  keys from S  and for 
the same groups select w keys from S , assign all selected keys to jiG ,  and remove them 
from S . 
 
3) For groups 1, −jiG  and jiG ,  where 2,1=i  and nj ,...,2=  select w  keys from S  
then remove them from S  and assign those keys to both 1, −jiG  and jiG , . 
 
Following the simple procedure above all the key pools for all zones are arranged. 
After uniformly picking m  keys for each node from the corresponding key pool and nodes 
are ready for deployment. 
 
This scheme can be enlarged horizontally or vertically without any extra arrangement. 
Adding new nodes deployed keys from the appropriate key pool in the alternating manner 
in ABCD scheme allows the extension of network. A depiction is given in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9. Extending ABCD scheme 
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4.4.1 A modification to ABCD scheme: ABCD-Cyclic 
 
ABCD scheme can enlarge in one direction (horizontally or vertically) without 
needing generation of new key pools. In order to allow the scheme to be enlarged in both 
directions, a variant of ABCD scheme, ABCD-Cyclic scheme is proposed. This scheme is 
an extension to ABCD scheme such that first two key pools used in the first line of 
deployment share some number of keys with the key pools used in the last line of 
deployment. Such an approach allows the scheme to enlarge in the other direction. Assume 
that the deployment area is a nn ×  grid. In order to enlarge the network 1+n th line is 
deployed again as line 1, the 2+n th line is deployed as line 2  and line xn +  is deployed 
as line x .  
 
ABCD-Cyclic scheme allows enlargement in both directions without needing 
generation of new key pools. In Figure 4.10 a depiction of ABCD-Cyclic scheme is 
presented. Enlarging the scheme in vertical direction is an easy task. Nodes that are to be 
deployed are loaded with keys as the nodes in the first line of deployment. In this way, 
generation of new key pools is avoided. In order to further extend the scheme new nodes 
are deployed as in the second, third, etc. lines. For a depiction please see Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.10. ABCD-Cyclic Scheme 
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Figure 4.11. Extending ABCD-Cyclic Scheme
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5 SIMULATIONS AND TEST RESULTS  
 
 
In this section a detailed examination and discussion of our schemes are provided, 
also comparison of our schemes with previously designed ones (basic scheme and scheme 
by Du et al.) is included. In order to be able to provide a proper examination and 
comparison of the basic scheme and our schemes, our schemes need to be distributed as in 
the basic scheme, in other words distribution of nodes in each zone should be uniform to be 
able to compare it with our schemes. Actually without such an arrangement comparison 
between our schemes and other schemes with different distribution assumptions is not 
correct. There is no such arrangement for the scheme proposed in [15] since normal 
distribution of nodes in each zone is assumed. 
 
All simulations are carried out using Matlab. Simulations mainly focus on the 
analysis of key relations and connectivity issues. All simulations results are again converted 
to easily readable format, in other words, they are reflected as graphs again by the use of 
Matlab. Well-known schemes and basic scheme are all implemented in order to be able to 
compare them with the designed ones in this thesis. An 1000m× 1000m deployment area is 
assumed because many schemes designed until now base their simulations and analysis on 
that deployment area. Also since proposed schemes in this thesis are based on grid based 
deployment, 1000m× 1000m zone is mapped to a 1010 × grid so, each zone is an 
100 m× 100m area. Size of the global key pool ( S ), with another saying, total number of 
keys used is100000 . Each node is assumed to have a communication range of 40 meters.  
 
5.1 Definitions 
 
There exist some terms that are frequently used throughout this chapter. Local 
connectivity, global connectivity and resiliency are the most important terms that must be 
examined. 
 
Local connectivity is the probability that two neighboring nodes share a key; with the 
aid of this key they can establish a secure communication link. In simulations this 
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probability is estimated as below. 
For each node iN , ni ,...,1=  where n  is the total number of nodes in the sensor 
network. 
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 where p  is the estimated local connectivity, iK  is the event that 
node i  shares a key with one of its neighbors in its communication range and iE  is the 
event that node i has a neighbor in its communication range. 
 
Global connectivity can be defined as 
N
Gs
where sG  refers to the largest isolated 
component that can securely communicate and N  refers to the whole graph such that nodes 
that cannot communicate with any other node is excluded. Nodes that cannot communicate 
with any other node are excluded from N  because this is caused by Gaussian distribution 
not by our schemes. 
 
In a sensor network whenever a sensor node is compromised all keys stored in this 
sensor are also compromised. These compromised keys can be used to secure some other 
secure communication links in the whole network. The ratio of all compromised 
communication links to all secure communication links gives the fraction of the 
communications compromised. Resiliency is the fraction of remaining secure 
communication links and can be computed by subtracting fraction of communications 
compromised from1. In simulations resiliency is computed as follows. 
 
Some nodes are randomly selected and the number of links secured by all those keys 
in those nodes is divided by the number of all secure links in the network. This test is 
evaluated for 10  times and mean of the communications compromises are computed. In the 
end, for a specific number of compromised nodes resiliency is estimated. 
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5.2 Simulation parameters 
 
The deployment area is a 1010 ×  grid and each zone in this grid is an 100m 100× m 
area. Total number of keys used (global key pool size) is 100000 . For each zone nodes are 
assumed to be deployed airborne as batches from a moving vehicle such as an airplane. 
These batches are deployed targeting the center of each zone. However, deployed nodes are 
diversified from the center of that zone according to Gaussian distribution 
where 1002 =α m. Communication range of a sensor node is 40 meters. Please note that 
Scheme by Du et al [15] also assumes the same deployment parameters. These parameters 
are selected to be compatible with previously proposed schemes If these parameters are 
changed in the simulations for some reason this fact will be explicitly stated. 
 
In our schemes key sharing percentage between key pools is an important parameter. 
In ABAB scheme there exist two large key pools sharing a  percent keys. In order to decide 
on a , the following test is performed. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Deciding simulation parameters for ABAB scheme 
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In figure 5.1 ABAB scheme is simulated with different key sharing percentages and 
with two different key ring sizes. For 10=a  and 200=m , local connectivity increases and 
for remaining key sharing percentages local connectivity is almost same. For  100=m  case 
the curve is almost flat which means that for small key ring sizes, the effect of key sharing 
percentage is not significant. Thus based on these observations to keep the network more 
connected 10=a  is chosen as the key sharing percentage and for all ABAB simulations. 
 
 For ABCD scheme, simulations are done to determine key sharing percentage 
between key pools. Key sharing percentage versus local connectivity is depicted in Figure 
5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2. Deciding simulation parameters for ABCD scheme 
 
In this case, for 100=m  the local connectivity curve is almost flat. For the other case 
where 200=m , the rate of local connectivity starts to reduce when 10=a . Increase in local 
connectivity continues until 25=a  but 10=a  is selected as the key sharing percentage. 
This is because, when this scheme is enlarged for some reason since key pools are very 
small as compared to ABAB scheme, same keys will be used very frequently which 
decreases the resiliency. Also in order to unify the simulations, key sharing percentage for 
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ABCD scheme is set to 10 percent. 
 
5.3 Relation between key ring size, connectivity and resiliency 
 
In order to examine the relationships between key ring size connectivity and 
resiliency, some simulation results are provided. Intuitively, when the number of keys 
stored in a sensor node increases, local and global connectivity increase. On the other hand, 
since number of keys stored in each sensor increases if a node is compromised then more 
keys are compromised. In other words, resiliency against node capture decreases. The most 
important point is to increase local and global connectivity without increasing the key ring 
size. Basic scheme does not make use of deployment knowledge. In our proposed schemes, 
we make use of simple deployment knowledge to increase connectivity without increasing 
the key ring size. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Relation between key ring size and local connectivity 
 
In Figure 5.3 a depiction of relation between the key ring size and local connectivity 
is provided. Local connectivity increases as number of keys deployed in each node 
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increases. Global connectivity is determined by local connectivity and it also increases as 
the key ring size increases, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Relation between key ring size and global connectivity 
 
Resiliency is also determined by the key ring size. When key ring size increases, local 
and global connectivity both increase but resiliency decreases since whenever a node is 
compromised more keys are revealed and more secure communication links are 
compromised. As mentioned before, the point is to increase local connectivity using less 
number of keys. In proposed schemes, location knowledge is used to decrease the key ring 
size to provide reasonable connectivity in that network and the network can be still resilient 
against node capture attacks. In Figure 5.5, relation between key ring size and resiliency is 
shown.  
 
Simulations in this section assume a network of 400  nodes deployed on a 44 ×  grid. 
There exist 100  nodes deployed for each zone and variance of those simulations is set 
to 1002 =σ m. Network size in these simulations is kept small because the motivation is to 
exemplify the relation between the key ring size, connectivity and resiliency. 
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Figure 5.5. Relation between key ring size and resiliency 
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5.4 Performance evaluation of proposed schemes 
 
Basic scheme is the scheme in which a novel approach to key distribution in sensor 
networks is proposed. Basic scheme does not assume any prior deployment knowledge. In 
ABAB scheme a little prior deployment knowledge is assumed and with the aid of little 
piece of knowledge, local connectivity and thus resiliency against node capture are 
improved. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to local connectivity 
 
Local connectivity is a measure that enables comparison of key distribution schemes. 
With less number of keys deployed in sensor nodes if better connectivity can be achieved 
then the scheme designed would be more resilient to node captures. In Figure 5.6, a 
comparison of the basic scheme and ABAB scheme is provided. The main idea is that the 
basic scheme offers a novel approach to key distribution but its deployment assumption 
would yield unrealistic results that are satisfactory as compared to scenarios that have 
assumptions close to the real world. The basic scheme is not suitable for large sensor node 
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deployments; its application areas can be restricted to small deployments over attended 
areas. Local connectivity and resiliency are closely related concepts and the aim of the 
designed schemes should be increasing the local connectivity using less number of keys 
thus capturing nodes yields compromise of less number of keys and compromise of less 
number of communication links Since ABAB scheme performs better than the basic 
scheme in terms of local connectivity; it is obvious that it will also perform better in terms 
of resiliency according to the close relations between those concepts. Analytic and 
simulation results from the comparison of the basic scheme and ABAB scheme are 
depicted in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to resiliency by 
simulation 
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Figure 5.8. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to resiliency 
analytically 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Key ring size versus local connectivity for four different schemes 
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Figure 5.10. Comparison of analytic and simulation results of ABAB scheme with 33% 
connectivity 
 
In Figure 5.9 local connectivity provided by different schemes is presented. The 
highest local connectivity with fewer keys is provided by the scheme that is presented in 
[15] because of the usage of location knowledge. Despite its complication it provides high 
local connectivity with less number of keys since each zone acts as a little deployment 
region over the whole deployment region. The main idea behind it can be described as a 
generalization of whole deployment over a grid deployment region. ABCD scheme 
performs well as compared to the basic scheme since again it makes use of deployment 
knowledge even it is much less complicated than the one in [15] (Scheme by Du et al). 
ABCD-Cyclic scheme performs almost same as the original ABCD scheme. Because 
ABCD-Cyclic scheme is deployed with the same number of keys with ABCD scheme and 
the effect of two key pools shared between the first and the last line of deployment is 
insignificant. Thus ABCD scheme and ABCD-Cyclic schemes perform almost same in 
terms of local connectivity. ABAB scheme and the basic scheme seem to perform almost 
the same according to the simulations. Actually this is not the case because comparing the 
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basic scheme to other three schemes yields results such that the basic scheme performs well 
because all nodes in the network are deployed uniformly on the deployment area which is 
not applicable when real deployment scenarios are considered. So even ABAB scheme 
seems to perform no good than the basic scheme, actually any deployment scheme 
regarding sensor networks should be considered keeping this in mind and the performance 
of the designed scheme should be treated according to this practical fact. Comparison of all 
those schemes both with the assumption of the uniform node deployment of the basic 
scheme and without that assumption are provided to give a better understanding of the 
concept. Further explanation and analysis of the performance of ABAB scheme and the 
basic scheme is provided at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
ABAB scheme is analyzed in two ways, both analytical and simulation. The 
difference between these two examinations is reflected to the graph in Figure 5.10. Results 
of the simulations indicate a higher portion of the communications of the network to be 
compromised as the number of compromised nodes increases because of the distribution of 
nodes on the deployment area is not uniform (remember that distribution of nodes in each 
zone is normal). Basically fraction of the compromised keys can be estimated easily as  
  )1(1 x
S
m
−− . (1) 
where m  is the key ring size, S   is the size of the global key pool, and x  is the number of 
compromised nodes. 
 
Supplementing the analytical analysis of network compromise including the 
distribution criteria is beyond the scope. Mainly, all the simulations consist of 10000  
numbers of nodes and a global key pool of 100000. Even schemes other than the basic 
scheme are tested with a global key pool that includes slightly more number of keys, since 
the global key pool size cannot be set exactly 100000 when those schemes are simulated. 
The difference between those two analyses is because of taking the node distribution into 
account. In those simulations local connectivity is 33 percent and required number of keys 
to achieve that connectivity is 200. When the number of keys in key ring of each node 
decreases local connectivity and therefore the resiliency against node capture can be 
improved which is obvious. 
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Figure 5.11. All schemes are compared with respect to their resiliency 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Resiliency of ABCD scheme with 33% local connectivity 
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ABCD scheme provides better resiliency than both the basic scheme and ABAB 
scheme. A depiction is presented in Figure 5.11. ABCD scheme needs less keys, in other 
words in order to provide the same local connectivity it needs a smaller key ring size (95 
keys for providing 33% local connectivity). ABAB scheme seems to be less resilient 
against node capture but this point is examined at the beginning of this chapter, but it is 
obvious that ABCD scheme performs well even it is much less complicated than the 
scheme proposed by Du et al. in [15]. ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic schemes perform almost 
same in terms of resiliency. In local connectivity discussion, it is mentioned that they 
almost provide same local connectivity with the same key ring size. So, it is obvious that 
they provide almost same resiliency against node capture. According to the simulation 
results the scheme proposed in [15] offers the best resiliency against the node capture. It is 
because this scheme decreases the number of keys to be used for each node. In other words, 
nodes that are deployed on the same zone needs to have much less number of keys to 
provide the same connectivity as compared to the other schemes. ABCD scheme has also a 
substantial decrease in the number of keys to be deployed in each node. Even it is not as 
resilient as the scheme in [15] since it is much applicable when real deployment scenarios 
are considered, it is obvious that it provides a substantial decrease (as depicted in Figure 
5.9) in the number of keys needs to be used and thus a great improvement in local 
connectivity and resiliency. Analytic and simulation results for ABCD scheme are also 
provided in Figure 5.12. 
 
Another issue about the distribution is the variance and just applicable to ABAB 
scheme and the basic scheme. During all the simulations of ABAB scheme and ABCD 
scheme, 1002 =σ m is assumed. Deployment points for each batch are 100m apart. If σ  is 
decreased than an increase in local connectivity and resiliency is expected. In simulations 
of which results are depicted in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 602 =σ m is assumed. 
 
When the variance is decreased both the local connectivity and the resiliency against 
the node capture are improved. This exemplifies the effect of distribution, and depicted in 
Figure 5.13 and in Figure 5.14. 
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Figure 5.13. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to local connectivity 
by decreasing variance 
 
When variance is decreased nodes can find neighbor nodes they share a common key 
because simply the number of neighbors is increased where the other parameters are kept 
constant. Also without changing the distribution of nodes in each zone, ABAB scheme 
yields improvement in resiliency just by simply decreasing the variance as depicted in 
Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.14. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to resiliency by 
decreasing variance 
 
ABAB scheme is simulated with different variance values where, 502 =σ m , 
602 =σ m, 802 =σ m and 1002 =σ m. For these variance samples ABAB scheme is 
examined in terms of local connectivity and resiliency. Results are shown in Figure 5.15 
and Figure 5.16 respectively. In the cases where variance decreased better local 
connectivity is achieved with less number of keys. Since better local connectivity is 
provided with less number of keys it is obvious that resiliency achieved will be better as 
compared to the case where 1002 =σ m.  
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Figure 5.15. Local connectivity examination with different variance samples for ABAB 
scheme 
 
 
Figure 5.16. Resiliency examinations with different variance samples for ABAB scheme 
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Global connectivity is another determiner of the key distribution schemes and it is 
explained in Section 5.1. Scheme by Du et al. provides the highest global connectivity but 
slightly better than ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic schemes. Actually even the global 
connectivity that is provided by ABAB scheme with 100 keys may be more than enough 
when the real world scenarios are considered. A depiction of global connectivity of these 
schemes is provided in Figure 5.17. 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Basic scheme and ABAB scheme compared with respect to global 
connectivity 
 
5.5 Discussions 
 
In this section, further examination of schemes is provided especially comments on 
inconsistency of simulation and analytic results of the scheme by Du et al. are remarkably 
important. A detailed inspection of this scheme is provided and some concluding remarks 
about scheme by Huang [16] are provided. 
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Figure 5.18. Scheme by Du et al. simulation and analytic results compared 
 
The scheme in [15] did not give simulation results for their schemes regarding 
resiliency. Actually their results are based on the analytic Formula (1). Analytic results for 
their scheme are more than satisfactory, but actually this is not the case. Formula (1) is used 
to calculate the probability that a key K  is compromised where x  nodes are compromised. 
It does not yield the result that the percentage of secure communications compromised 
when x  nodes compromised. Actually Formula (1) defines an upper bound on resiliency of 
the schemes. It does not consider the effect of distribution on deployment area. So it should 
be explicitly mentioned that analytic results are upper bounds on resiliency of the proposed 
schemes and must be treated in this way. In simulations, percentage of communications 
compromised can be estimated and that estimation differs from the analytical results. The 
difference between these two results is not provided by the authors of the paper, but it is 
implemented in this thesis in order to have a better idea about this scheme. The simulation 
results indicate that the scheme itself is not that much satisfactory as presented in the 
original paper. A depiction of these results is presented in Figure 5.18. 
 
Another issue while computing the resiliency of these schemes is that: How should be 
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the nodes captured? Throughout this thesis all resiliency simulations are based on uniform 
capture of sensor nodes. Selective capture of nodes includes involving the knowledge of 
key distribution which is quite possible. Huang offered a scheme [16] that involves 
selective capture of nodes. Huang mainly focuses on the capturing all the communications 
of whole network. Also, critics of random key deployment schemes are provided in [16] 
such that their scheme is secure until a predefined number of nodes have been 
compromised. In other words, it mentioned that their scheme is perfectly secure against 
capture of some number of nodes, but after that point whole network is compromised 
however which is not mentioned. Also that scheme is not scalable in any way, which is not 
suitable for cases in which the network should enlarge for some reason. Huang has another 
objection to assumption of disseminating nodes normally onto the deployment zone since 
data that is to be sensed may be distributed uniformly such that it must be sensed 
uniformly. So, it is assumed that nodes are deployed uniformly onto each zone. Actually, if 
this is the case, nodes must be deployed onto on such an area that can be easily accessible 
all the time, in other words, the deployment area must be attended. But in this thesis the 
deployment area is assumed to be unattended, so, in order to be realistic such a distribution 
technique is assumed in this thesis.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis, we aimed to develop a random key pre-distribution scheme for sensor 
networks. For this purpose, we examined some of the previously designed random key pre-
distribution schemes. Then we presented a generalized random key pre-distribution scheme 
for sensor networks. We derived three special cases of the designed scheme called ABAB, 
ABCD, ABCD-Cyclic and examined them with respect to previously designed and widely 
accepted schemes. In ABAB scheme there exist two key pools A, B for all sensor 
deployment field and in ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic scheme for each line of deployment 
there exist two key pools. The idea is to propose random key pre-distribution schemes that 
offer simplicity in deployment phase; with respect to such simplicity in deployment phase 
we try to achieve considerable connectivity and resiliency. We simulated these three 
schemes and compared their resiliency, global and local connectivity to other widely 
accepted schemes. 
 
It is evident that, the scheme we proposed can be used to further derive new random 
key pre-distribution schemes according to security, and simplicity to be provided. The 
scheme proposed in this thesis can be considered as a base and a generalization of random 
key pre-distribution schemes proposed until now. The three derivations of the scheme 
present random key pre-distribution schemes that provide considerable security while 
keeping key distribution task as much as simple. 
 
Available memory is one of the most important restrictions of sensor nodes. Since the 
available memory is limited as compared to many other electronic devices, schemes that 
achieve better connectivity and resiliency with smaller key ring sizes are needed. In order 
to provide %33  connectivity, our proposed ABAB scheme requires 172  keys while the 
basic scheme can achieve the same local connectivity with 200 keys. Also our proposed 
ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic schemes both provide %36  local connectivity with 100  keys 
where the basic scheme can only provide %1 connectivity, and the scheme by Du et al. [15] 
provides %70 connectivity. ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic schemes provide %33  local 
connectivity with only 95  keys where the basic scheme requires 200 keys, and the scheme 
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by Du et al. requires 46  keys. When 100  nodes are assumed to be compromised fraction of 
communications compromised in the basic scheme is %20 , in ABCD and ABCD-Cyclic 
schemes fraction of communications compromised is %12  and in the scheme by Du et al. it 
is %7 . All these results prove that our schemes provide promising connectivity and 
resiliency according to their applicability, and deployment simplicity.  
 
The idea presented in this work is based on making a tradeoff between deployment 
simplicity and security provided while assuring that the security provided is reasonable 
with respect to that level of simplicity provided in key distribution phase. We do not come 
up with a unique solution to key distribution problem in sensor networks, but we come up 
with a simple, applicable and promising solution to key distribution in sensor networks. 
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